4 min readJul 23, 2026 04:42 PM IST
First published on: Jul 23, 2026 at 04:42 PM IST
US President Donald Trump is trapped in a strategic deadlock with Iran with no clear options. The US can neither win the war nor withdraw at this stage. Negotiations remain the most viable option, but their success is doubtful given weaknesses in Trump’s style of deal-making. Trump’s delusional notion that bombing and negotiations can run in parallel is inherently flawed and futile.
Trump’s negotiating strategy suffers from inconsistency, inexperience and ineptitude. In his negotiating team, there are two sets of actors: Three states and two individuals: Oman, Qatar and Pakistan; and Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Both sets of actors were chosen for their loyalty to Trump rather than for real experience in strategic affairs.
A negotiation requires trust-building and neutrality. Negotiators should appear neutral with the confidence of both parties. However, in the case of the ongoing negotiations, they are running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Oman and Qatar are regional allies of the US, while Pakistan is trying to become one with its military chief, Asim Munir. None of them is viewed as a neutral actor. These actors carry little political weight, and their legitimacy in global politics is highly suspect. Witkoff and Kushner cannot restrain Trump from making provocative statements, while Oman, Qatar and Pakistan possess little leverage over Iran.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the ongoing negotiations have failed to achieve anything substantial, apart from an episodic ceasefire.
If Trump’s negotiating strategies are flawed, his war strategy is no better. Trump desires an easy victory in Iran. Motivated by his military success in Venezuela, he expected a similar outcome in Iran. But a victory requires full political and military commitment with a high economic cost.
Trump does not have the political or economic capital to risk a full escalation. His ratings are declining, his loyalists are jumping ship, and the Republican Party fears losses in the midterm elections in November, in which 435 seats in the House of Representatives, 35 seats in the Senate, and 36 state governor seats are at stake. The midterm elections are important because the outcome will affect Trump’s policies over the next two years. The available projections indicate that Democrats have a modest advantage over Republicans in winning a majority in the House of Representatives.
Further, Trump cannot win the war because there are limits to American firepower. He indisputably commands the most powerful military in the world, whose defence budget equals that of the next six countries combined, but the US’s ability to project power beyond the region faces serious constraints. The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria clearly demonstrate this limitation. Perhaps Trump has forgotten the disgraceful US exit from Afghanistan and its failures in Iraq.
Trump wanted regime change in Iran, but he cannot even keep the Strait of Hormuz open. He wanted a complete decimation of the Iranian military, but he is incapable of even protecting the US’s Middle Eastern allies from Iranian drones and missiles. He wanted to consolidate American hegemony in the region; instead, he has driven the Gulf states to deepen their ties with China as an alternative security guarantor.
At the global level, the Iran war has done irreversible damage to the reputation of the US as a rational and reconciling superpower. Allies no longer view Washington as a reliable partner in winning a war, striking a deal or securing peace. NATO refused to endorse Trump on Iran, the Gulf countries are turning cautious, and the Global South views the US as imperious, hegemonic and erratic. According to a recent Pew Research Survey covering 36 countries, China is viewed more favourably than the US in 25 countries. The trend is likely to continue.
Trump’s Iran strategy has reached a cul-de-sac where every option — war, withdrawal or deal — entails high strategic costs. In the short term, a further escalation involving other regional states is the most likely outcome. The leading countries of the Global South must step forward to broker a ceasefire and advance a de-escalation process. Strategic silence today may result in high strategic costs tomorrow.
The writer is professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi
