As the Delhi High Court upheld the temporary blocking of Telegram in India until June 22, a key takeaway was the court’s expansion of the scope of entities that can be brought under Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act.
Section 69A and its associated Rules empower the government to block access to “information” through any “computer resource” as an emergency measure if sovereignty and integrity of the country is threatened.
While Telegram had argued that such power can be exercised only with respect to “specific information” and can’t be construed to imply “a blanket restriction on an entire intermediary platform”, the court disagreed.
Justice Tejas Karia said the legislative intent was to keep the definition of “information” under the Act broad. Thus, a platform like Telegram, too, will be covered by Section 69A of the IT Act.
Can the government block an entire app?
The court said yes.
Citing Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act, which defines what ‘information’ is, Justice Karia opined that legislative intent was that the expression “information” is required to be “construed expansively”. Thus, “there is no reason to exclude an application or platform from the ambit of the said expression.”
“An application or platform, in its ordinary and commonly understood sense, is a computer programme or software designed to perform specified functions for an end user. In view of the express inclusion of ‘codes’, ‘computer programmes’ and ‘software’ within the definition of ‘information’ under Section 2(1)(v) of the IT Act, there is no reason to exclude an application or platform from the ambit of the said expression,” it said.
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Relying on definitions of “computer resource” and “computer” under the Act, the court held that this makes “it evident that information generated, transmitted, received, stored, or hosted through such software-based infrastructure falls within the ambit of Section 69A of the IT Act.”
“An application or platform performs logical, arithmetic and memory functions through electronic, magnetic or optical impulses, and includes input, output, processing, storage, computer software and communication facilities connected with a computer system or computer network. Accordingly, this court is of the view that Respondent No. 1 was empowered under Section 69A of the IT Act to issue directions for blocking public access to Telegram,” the court ruled.
Did the government follow the rules before blocking Telegram?
The court said it did and there was application of mind. Telegram had claimed the government acted without proper reasoning.
The court reasoned that the temporary blocking disclosed reasons as to why the step was taken: preventing “potential grave implications for public order… and preventing commission of cognisable offences arising from circulation of exam-related misinformation and purported exam papers on Telegram, particularly in light of prior incidents relating to NEET UG 2026.”
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“… this Court is of the view that given the emergency nature of the impugned order, the reasons supplied in arriving at the decision were sufficient… The court is of the considered opinion that the (June 16 order) contains reasons and there exists a direct and substantial nexus between the direction issued and the reasons assigned,” the court held.
It also observed that the government “strictly followed the procedural steps” as required under Section 69A. It said Telegram was given a hearing after the order was passed, as per IT Rules, 2009, by a review committee. The committee, on June 18, had upheld the temporary blocking order.
The court noted that the rules provide that in cases of emergency “such as the present one”, an interim blocking direction may be issued upon the satisfaction of the Secretary of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology of India (MeitY) under Section 69A, and a subsequent post-decisional hearing is to be given before a final order is passed — either confirming or revoking the interim blocking direction.
The court held that the June 16 order was passed “upon consideration of the overall architectural features of Telegram, which rendered it impracticable to prevent misuse of the platform through the less restrictive measure of blocking individual items of content alone.”
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Was the action proportional to the potential harm envisaged?
Yes, the court ruled. The court weighed the blocking action through the lens of whether the objective to prevent misuse of the platform outweighs the ability of 150 million users in India to access the platform for lawful purposes.
It applied the proportionality test based on the Supreme Court’s Anuradha Bhasin judgment, which had dealt with the scope of internet shutdowns in Jammu & Kashmir in the backdrop of the abrogation of Article 370.
The Anuradha Bhasin judgment outlines that there has to be a legitimate objective, existence of rational nexus between the objective and the measure adopted, the necessity of such measure, and adoption of the least restrictive measure available.
The court noted from MeitY’s June 16 and 18 orders that entity-specific actions, including reporting and removal of channels, groups, bots and accounts were “repeatedly found to be ineffective and inadequate.”
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“The temporary blocking of Telegram under the orders is operative only until 22.06.2026, while the disabling of the message-editing feature is… until 30.06.2026. The limited temporal scope of these measures demonstrates that they are narrowly tailored and confined to the period strictly necessary for securing the stated objective,” the court observed.
It reasoned that the government’s temporary blocking order was thus the “least restrictive measure for achieving the stated objective”.
